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To what degree do organizational attributes affect individual performance in knowledge-based industries? 
If we were to randomly move an individual from a position at a given firm to an identical position at another 
firm, how much would that individual’s performance change? For what kinds of positions and environments 
should we expect the effect of organization on performance to be the greatest? These are some of the most 
fundamental questions pertaining to the theory of the firm and they have inspired a large body of work.1 
Unfortunately, these are also extremely difficult questions to tackle empirically: Employees never 
move randomly across firms and any change in performance around a job change may be due to innate 
ability. We also cannot fairly contrast the performance of two individuals working at two different firms 
and attribute any observed difference in performance to differences in organizational attributes across these 
two firms as the assignment of individuals to firms itself cannot be thought of as occurring independently 
of individuals’ innate abilities. Further complicating matters, individual performance is rarely observable.2 
In most cases, we observe only firm-level outputs. Yet firm-level outputs are the result of a complex 
combination of inputs from many individuals and firm-level resources. 
In this paper, we introduce a setting that, we believe, addresses these challenges. We then use this 
setting to test whether organization affects individual performance by creating an environment in which 
employees interact with and learn from each other (= treatment effect), or whether organizational design 
does not affect individual performance and “higher-performing firms” simply hire more productive 
individuals (= selection effect). 
                                                          
1 Since the seminal work of Coase (1937) economists have argued about the origins, role, and rationales of power in the theory of 
the firm. One line of argument in a long-standing debate on organizations is that ownership of physical assets is not the only source 
of power within a firm. Hart (1989) argues that, to the extent that there are complementarities across employee tasks, the total 
output of a group of workers may exceed the sum of the workers’ individual outputs. Klein (1988) similarly distinguishes physical 
from human asset specificity by pointing out that an organization is embedded in the human capital of a firm’s employees but is 
greater than the sum of its parts. Rajan and Zingales (1998, 2001) examine how human capital might define firm boundaries. 
2 In asset-based industries, individual performance has been examined for simple tasks where output and performance are verifiable 
(for example, see the analysis of incentives and performance using fruit-pickers in Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2005)). 
However, this issue is less straightforward in knowledge-based industries because individuals working for firms in those industries 
rarely produce output in their own names. Even where they do, it may not be easy to verify either the quality or performance of the 
output. A notable example of a study addressing such questions in a knowledge-based industry is Ewens and Rhodes-Kropf (2015), 




Our identification comes from financial analysts’ coverage of mergers and acquisitions (M&As). 
Our focus on analysts allows us to quantify individual performance as we can directly observe one of the 
most important performance outputs that financial analysts produce, namely earnings forecasts. We also 
have an objective benchmark, in the form of actual reported earnings, against which earnings forecasts can 
be compared. 
More importantly, we believe our analyst/M&A setting represents a quasi-natural experiment that 
provides plausibly random variation in the treatment effect of firm-level resources. We compare, for a given 
M&A, the accuracy of an analyst’s earnings forecasts for the acquirer firm prior to the M&A with the 
accuracy of her forecasts for the firm that comes out of the M&A. We exploit two sources of variation: Our 
first source of variation comes from evaluating the performance of “Type 1 analysts” with that of “Type 2 
analysts.” Type 1 analysts are acquirer analysts who work for brokerages that, prior to the M&A, only cover 
the acquirer (and not the target). Type 2 analysts are acquirer analysts who work for brokerages that, prior 
to the M&A, also cover the target through the employment of a second analyst. If analysts rely heavily on 
broker-level resources such as colleagues, Type 2 analysts, who have in-house colleagues covering targets 
prior to M&As, should be at a significant advantage. In contrast, if organization does not affect individual 
performance and performance resides solely with analysts and the person-specific capital they have 
acquired over their careers, we should observe no performance differential between these two analyst types. 
Our second source of variation comes from comparing the performance of Type 2 analysts with 
that of “Type 3 analysts,” defined here as analysts that, themselves, cover both the acquirer and the target 
prior to the M&A. As noted above, Type 2 analysts cover the acquirer firm and have in-house colleagues 
covering the target prior to the M&A. If performance resides entirely with brokers, we should observe no 
meaningful performance difference between Type 3 and Type 2 analysts. On the other hand, if some broker-
specific knowledge is “lost in translation,” then analysts that, themselves, cover both the acquirer and the 




To isolate the treatment effect from potential selection effects that typically plague this literature, 
we examine individual performances across M&As for which the same individuals working at the same 
brokerage organizations represent distinct analyst types. To illustrate by example, consider Goldman-
Sachs-Analyst A covering two M&As. For the first M&A, the analyst covers the acquirer only; she has no 
in-house colleague covering the target prior to the M&A (= Type 1). In the second M&A, the analyst covers 
the acquirer; she also has an in-house colleague covering the target (= Type 2). We compare Goldman-
Sachs-Analyst A’s performance when she is of Type 1 to her performance when she is of Type 2. 
Selection explains the matching of Analyst A with Goldman Sachs. Since we examine differences 
in performance between two M&As for the same analyst working at the same brokerage, we essentially 
hold selection constant. Further, we include M&A fixed effects to mitigate the concern that analyst type 
and performance correlate with M&A characteristics. Put together, we believe our research design provides 
a relatively clean estimate for the effect of organization on individual performance. 
To preview our main results, we find that forecast errors for newly merged firms are higher than 
those for acquirers prior to M&As, consistent with newly merged firms’ earnings being more uncertain and 
more difficult to forecast than those of acquirer firms considered by themselves (at least in the initial period 
after the M&A). More importantly in the context of this study, acquirer-analysts do a substantially better 
job at predicting earnings for newly formed firms when they have colleagues covering targets prior to 
M&As. This result suggests that organization affects individual performance. 
We also find that analysts that, themselves, cover both the acquirer and the target outperform 
acquirer-analysts who “only” have colleagues covering the target, suggesting that, while organization 
affects individual performance, information can be lost in translation due to the presence of communication 
and coordination costs. 
The ability to transfer information is likely affected by a range of factors. Radner (1993), Bolton 
and Dewatripont (1994), Aghion and Tirole (1997), Garicano (2000), Stein (2002), and Garicano and 
Hansberg (2006) explore how organizational design and allocation of tasks affect incentives to collect and 
use information. A central idea in this literature is that information, particularly when it is soft and 
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subjective in nature, becomes increasingly harder to share as geographical and hierarchical distance 
increases.3 Coordinating a group of complementary specialized workers also becomes more costly as the 
number of specialists in a team increases (Becker and Murphy (1992)).  
Our results corroborate these views. While performance generally improves when an acquirer-
analyst has an in-house colleague covering a target, such “information spillover effect” is strongest when 
acquirer and target-analysts reside in the same locale and when acquirer- and target-analysts work within a 
small team. 
In addition to location and team size, our spillover effect is likely a function of the quality of 
colleagues. In line with this view, we find that the information spillover effect is particularly strong when 
an acquirer-analyst’s colleague is an Institutional Investor All-Star Analyst. Relatedly, we find that the 
spillover effect is stronger when a target-analyst has been covering the corresponding target firm for a 
longer time period and, as such, likely has a better understanding of that firm. 
We also study the impact of industry specialization on performance. Analysts or brokerages may 
strategically specialize in certain industry sectors. To the extent that industry specialization is correlated 
with analyst type, specialization may partially account for our findings. We find that, on average, analysts 
perform better if M&As are in their industries of primary expertise. However, we also find that 
specialization does not explain or dampen the information spillover effect that we document. 
Our study addresses at least three lines of research. First, our paper contributes to the literature on 
the theory of the firm and the role of human capital.4 Prior work, such as Mas and Moretti (2009), who 
study peer effects among cashiers at a supermarket, provides valuable evidence on productivity spillovers 
among “lower-skilled workers.” To the best of our knowledge, our study is the very first to quantify the 
degree to which high-skilled employees in knowledge-based industries owe their success to interactions 
with their colleagues.  
                                                          
3 Petersen and Rajan (2002), Mian (2006), Landier, Nair, and Wulf (2009), Liberti and Mian (2009), Agarwal and Hauswald (2010), 
Seru (2012), Liberti, Seru and Vig (2017), and Liberti (2017) study the effects of geographical and hierarchical distance on 
communication, production of information, and firm-level decision-making. 
4 For example, Kim, Morse, and Zingales (2009) examine research productivity at elite universities and question whether these 
universities have lost their competitive edge. 
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By studying information sharing among financial analysts, our work also complements recent work 
that examines information flows among (other) financial market participants, such as mutual fund families 
(Sialm and Tham 2016), institutional investors that trade debt and equity (Ivashina and Sun 2011), banks 
and mutual funds in the same financial conglomerate (Massa and Rehman 2008), and corporate boards 
(Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008). 
Finally, our work adds to the literature on professional forecasters. Evidence reported in the 
accounting and finance literature implies that financial analysts significantly alter market expectations (e.g., 
Stickel 1995, Womack 1996, Kothari 2001), in particular during times of economic uncertainty (Loh and 
Stulz 2017) and when the firms covered have many intangible assets (Gupta-Mukherjee 2014). Successful 
analysts quickly earn “superstar” status via high-profile awards, press coverage, and lucrative compensation 
packages. Such accolades are predicated on the assumption that a large portion of an analyst’s performance 
is person-specific and portable, i.e., independent of the brokerage employing the analyst in question. In this 
study, we provide evidence that individuals owe much of their success to the organizations that employ 
them. A superstar moving across organizations may thus be unable to maintain her customary level of 
performance at her new employer.5 
 
2. Data 
We focus on M&As that involve publicly traded acquirers and publicly traded targets. We identify target 
firms in the CRSP database via the delisting file and by reference to whether a security is marked by a first-
digit delisting code of 2 or 3. The delisting file provides us with the PERMNO of the disappearing target 
firm as well as the PERMNO of the acquirer firm, which overwrites the PERMNO of the disappearing firm. 
Our sample period runs from 1984 through 2011. 
                                                          
5 Groysberg, Lee, and Nanda (2008) and Groysberg (2010) study whether star analysts’ knowledge is portable across brokerages. 




We merge the PERMNOs of acquirers and targets with data from the Institutional Brokers 
Estimates System (IBES) database, which contains analyst earnings forecasts and actual reported earnings 
data. We measure performance using the scaled forecast error (FE). In particular, for each analyst i working 
for broker j and following the acquirer prior to M&A m and the new firm that comes out of the M&A, we 
compute FE for quarterly earnings t in the two-year window around the effective date of the M&A.6 FE is 
defined as the absolute difference between analyst i’s most recent earnings-per-share (EPS) forecast and 
the actual announced EPS divided by the stock price as of the corresponding fiscal quarter end. We require 




|     (1) 
On average, the scaled forecast error in our sample is 0.172%. 
To isolate the treatment effect of organization on analyst performance from selection effects, we 
exploit variation in the coverage of targets within analyst-broker, i.e., for the same analyst working at the 
same brokerage. As mentioned in the introduction, we classify each analyst as a Type 1, Type 2, or Type 3 
analyst. To reiterate the differences between analyst types and to illustrate our empirical design, we offer 
the following example: 
 
M&A 1: Analyst 1Broker A covers Acquirer     (Analyst 1 ≡ Type 1) 
M&A 2: Analyst 1Broker A covers Acquirer, Analyst 2Broker A covers Target (Analyst 1 ≡ Type 2) 
M&A 3: Analyst 1Broker A covers Acquirer and Target    (Analyst 1 ≡ Type 3) 
 
We study the performance of the same analyst working at the same broker (here, Analyst 1, who 
works for Broker A) across the above three M&As. If organization affects performance, Analyst 1 should 
do a better job covering the newly formed firm when she is of Type 2 than when she is of Type 1. If broker-
                                                          
6 In Section 5, we show that our results are robust to alternate event windows. We focus on analysts that follow the acquirer prior 
to the M&A (as opposed to those that follow the target prior to the M&A) because the acquirer is generally much larger than the 




specific knowledge is lost in translation, Analyst 1 should perform better when she is of Type 3 than when 
she is of Type 2. 
In our analysis, we consider only analyst-broker pairs that exhibit variation in type across multiple 
M&As. Our final sample contains 2,394 analysts working at 215 brokerages covering 2,403 acquirers, 
resulting in 15,939 analyst-broker–stock pairs. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. On average, acquirer firms are approximately six times 
larger than target firms, with around seventy percent of M&As involving firms within the same Global 
Industry Classification Standard (GICS) sectors (hereafter referred to as “related M&As”). The number of 
analysts following an acquirer prior to an M&A is approximately three times that of the number following 
a target. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the financial analysts included in our final sample. 10,921 
out of the 15,939 analyst-broker-firm pairs (or 69%) represent cases in which analysts are of Type 1, 1,468 
(or 9%) represent cases in which analysts are of Type 2, and 3,550 (or 22%) represent cases in which 
analysts are of Type 3. Note that any analyst-broker pair appears multiple times across the various analyst-
type columns in Table 2, depending on how many M&As the analyst-broker pair covers and to which type 
the analyst belongs for a given M&A. 
Table 2 shows that Type 1 analysts tend to cover smaller acquisitions (as approximated by the size 
of a target). When analysts are of Type 2, they tend to follow larger acquirers. When analysts are of Type 
3, they tend to cover larger acquisitions. Importantly, the scaled forecast error in the period prior to an M&A 
is neither economically nor statistically different across analyst types. 
Considering other analyst characteristics, we find that neither forecast horizon nor change in 
forecast bias differ across analyst type.7 We also find no meaningful difference in the number of years the 
                                                          
7 Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) show that forecast bias increases when brokerage-level M&As lead to a decrease in the number of 
analysts. In our setting, the number of analysts covering a newly formed firm increases compared with the number of analysts 
covering an acquirer prior to an M&A. Correspondingly, we observe a small decrease in bias around M&As. Thus, the increase in 




analyst has been covering the acquirer, number of stocks covered, number of sectors covered and fraction 
of analysts based in New York City. 
In untabulated analyses, we also compare our sample with the universe of IBES analysts. Our 
sample captures approximately half of the analysts in the IBES universe. On average, the analysts in our 
sample are similar to those in the IBES universe in terms of number of industries covered, location, and 
average forecast errors, although they tend to cover a greater number of firms and are slightly more 
experienced (results available upon request). 
 
3. Empirical Design 
In our empirical analysis, we measure the effects of information spillovers on performance by estimating a 
regression equation of the change in forecast error, ∆𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑚,𝑡 = 𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑚,𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑚,𝑝𝑟𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, on analyst type. 
The regression is estimated at the analyst-broker-M&A level. 
The regression equation is as follows: 
∆𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑚,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛼𝑚 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 2𝑖,𝑗,𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 3𝑖,𝑗,𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑋𝛿 + 𝑚,𝑖,𝑗,𝑡,  (2) 
where ∆FEi,j,m,t is the change in the absolute forecast error of analyst i, employed by brokerage j and 
covering the acquirer in M&A m at time t; αi,j and αm are analyst-broker and M&A fixed effects, 
respectively. Type 2 and Type 3 equal one if analysts are of Type 2 and Type 3, respectively. Type 1 
observations represent our counterfactual. X includes various controls to be detailed below. Standard errors 
account for correlations across observations of a given analyst-broker and M&A. 
Including analyst-broker fixed effects ensures that we are making comparisons within an 
individual–organization match, which, as we discuss above, absorbs selection effects. Including M&A fixed 
effects addresses the concern that the types of analysts covering a given M&A might be correlated with 
M&A characteristics, such as M&A size, whether an acquirer and a target are in the same industry, whether 
an M&A is part of an M&A wave, and/or the aggregate information environment.8 
                                                          
8 For example, we find that the increase in forecast errors around M&As is around one-third lower in related M&As. To the extent 
that related M&As are correlated with analyst type, this might bias our results. 
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Including no fixed effects would estimate the joint effect of both selection and treatment. Including 
analyst fixed effects (only) would allow selection effects to (still) influence our results as we would be 
making comparisons across brokerages. Lastly, including brokerage fixed effects (only) would hold 
organizational capital constant but compare across analysts. To the extent that any two analysts working at 
the same brokerage are interchangeable this would be fine. However, this is unlikely to be the case in reality.  
Before proceeding to report our results, we mention a few additional facets of our general empirical 
approach. Our analysis is equivalent to a difference-in-differences (DiD) test. A common concern with DiD 
tests is that the treatment group and the counterfactual are significantly different from each other and that 
any findings we observe reflect those differences rather than the proposed treatment effect.  
In our setting, this concern is less likely to play a role because the treatment group and the 
counterfactual represent the same group of analyst-broker pairs and inferences are made within those 
analyst-broker pairs. Relatedly, our empirical design exploits plausibly random variation in the organization 
of information within the same brokerage to understand the causal effects of information spillovers on 
performance. This allows us to absorb selection effects in a manner that would not be possible if we were 
to study the effect of organization on individual performance using a “fixed effects method,” as in Bertrand 
and Schoar (2003). The fixed-effects method draws its power from analyzing changes in performance as 
an analyst moves from one brokerage to another. Most job transfers cannot be thought of as independent of 
the analyst-person-specific performance component; instead, they might represent promotions or 
demotions. Disentangling the treatment effects and selection effects using job transfers is thus difficult, if 
not impossible, to do. 
Finally, earnings forecasts are only one of two primary quantifiable outputs that analysts produce. 
The second such output is an analyst’s overall recommendation whether a stock should be bought, held, or 
sold. We focus on earnings forecasts as they can be easily evaluated against the actual earnings announced; 





4. Main Results 
We find that forecast errors, on average, are 0.058 higher for newly merged firms than for acquirer firms 
prior to M&As. This increase in forecast errors represents a 33% jump and is statistically significant from 
zero at the 1% level. The average analyst coverage for newly formed firms is 9.7, compared with 8.1 for 
acquirers prior to M&As. The increase in forecast errors is thus unlikely to be the result of lower information 
production by analysts or lower analyst competition (Hong and Kacperczyk 2010). Instead, the spike in 
forecast errors suggests that, at least initially, earnings for newly merged firms exhibit greater uncertainty 
and are harder to predict than those for acquirer firms prior to M&As. 
Table 3 reports the results from regression equation (2). Column (1) of Table 3 presents the results 
when including analyst-broker and M&A fixed effects. We find that the change in forecast error is 0.020 
lower when analysts are of Type 2 and 0.030 lower when analysts are of Type 3. Both estimates are 
statistically significant. The coefficient estimate of 0.030 is also statistically different from the estimate of 
0.020 (p-value < 0.05). 
In Column (2), we include a set of time-varying analyst characteristics as additional controls. The 
first control measures the time the analyst in question has been following the corresponding acquirer. To 
capture time variation in the analyst’s work environment, we include the number of stocks the analyst 
follows, the number of GICS industry sectors the analyst follows, and the size of the analyst’s team. In 
particular, we identify the modal GICS industry sector of the analyst and label that sector the analyst’s 
“sector of expertise.” Team size is the number of (other) analysts at the analyst’s brokerage working in the 
analyst’s sector of expertise.  
When including these analyst characteristics, we observe that the change in forecast error is 0.020 
lower when analysts are of Type 2 and 0.029 lower when analysts are of Type 3. Again, both estimates are 
statistically significant. The estimate of 0.029 remains statistically different from the estimate of 0.020 (p-
value < 0.05).9 
                                                          
9 One concern is whether analysts forecast earnings objectively or are influenced by the provision of M&A advisory services. Using 
data from SDC Platinum, we classify each M&A transaction as “dependent” or “independent” based on whether a brokerage for 
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Together, our results suggest that information spillovers are an important determinant of individual-
level performance. Acquirer-analysts more successfully predict the performance of a newly formed firm 
when they can interact with colleagues and draw from in-house knowledge about the corresponding target 
firm.10 At the same time, our results suggest that some information is lost in translation as acquirer-analysts 
perform the best if, prior to M&As, they cover both acquirer firms and target firms themselves. 
 
4.1 Robustness 
Because most analysts and some brokerages specialize in industries and since most M&As are completed 
within a given industry, an M&A in which an analyst is of Type 2 is more likely to be in an analyst’s and 
broker’s industry of expertise. An M&A in which an analyst is of Type 1 is less likely to be in an analyst’s 
and broker’s industry of expertise. This, in turn, may partially account for our result that an analyst performs 
better when she is of Type 2 than when she is of Type 1. To assess the validity of this concern we show, in 
Column (3) of Table 3, the results of considering only analyst-broker pairs that vary in type within a GICS 
sector and after including analyst-broker-sector fixed effects. Our results remain virtually unchanged.11 
Another possible concern comes from our focus on acquirer analysts who continue to follow the 
newly formed firm after the M&A. When analysts are of Type 1, it is natural to choose them to cover newly 
formed firms. When analysts are of Type 2 and have in-house colleagues covering targets prior to M&As, 
tournaments within the brokerages decide which of the two analysts cover the newly formed firm. The 
strong performance we observe when an analyst is of Type 2 may therefore be a positive selection effect 
rather than a true treatment effect. 
                                                          
which an analyst works is the main advisor in the transaction as measured by total fees. In untabulated results, we find that our 
results still hold within the subsample of independent brokers (both economically and statistically). Controlling for whether a 
brokerage advises a given M&A does not alter our main results.  
10  Further corroborating this view, we find that our information spillover effect disappears when looking at the subset of 
observations in which target analysts leave their brokers within three months of the completion of an M&A (results available upon 
request). 
11 The number of observations drops from 15,939 to 14,770 because we now require variation in analyst type across M&As within 
a given sector. 
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Overall, we find that the vast majority of acquirer-analysts continue to cover newly formed firms 
even when they are of Type 2. In particular, we observe that 90.8% of Type 2 acquirer-analysts continue to 
cover newly formed firms, i.e., in only 9.2% of cases is it target-analysts who take over and cover newly 
formed firms. This strong imbalance is unlikely to be generated by differences in talent between acquirer- 
and target-analysts and more likely reflects the fact that acquirer firms are generally much larger than target 
firms, making acquirer-analysts the more natural choice for covering newly formed firms. In line with this 
view, we find that the fraction of Type 2 acquirer-analysts who continue to cover newly formed firms almost 
monotonically increases with the size of acquirers relative to targets. For instance, when acquirers are at 
least five times larger than targets, 95.2% of Type 2 acquirer-analysts continue to cover newly formed 
firms. 
In additional tests, we repeat our analysis within the subsample of M&As for which acquirers are 
at least five times larger than targets and for which, ex ante, talent-based tournament effects are less likely 
to play a role. As reported in Column (4) of Table 3, our results only become stronger within this subsample. 
A final concern with our interpretation is that analysts’ learning from M&As over time might be 
correlated with analyst type. For example, an analyst might start out as Type 1 and then become a Type 2 
or Type 3 analyst (for the same brokerage). To address this concern we identify each analyst’s first type in 
our sample. We find that analysts are essentially equally likely to start as Type 1 as they are to start as Type 
2 or Type 3 analysts. Further, while our main results suggest that analysts perform the best when they are 
of Type 3, for the subset of analysts that are both of Type 2 and Type 3 at different points in their careers, 
we find that Type 3 precedes Type 2 in 65.4% of cases. This result contradicts the abovementioned learning 
story. 
 
4.2 The Nature of Information Sharing 
We next turn our attention to the channels through which organization affects performance. The efficacy 
of information spillovers relies both on the ability of agents to share information and the costs of 
information transmission. Applied to our setting, we expect two organizational attributes of a brokerage: 
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geographical distance between analysts and team size, to affect the effectiveness of information 
transmission, in particular given the soft and subjective nature of the information being transmitted. 
Some recent papers examine whether location clustering affects stock investment decisions. Ahern 
(2014) finds that insider trading is more prominent among traders in the same locale and that the 
profitability of trades decreases with distance. Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005) find that mutual fund 
managers are more likely to trade stocks if other managers in the same locale trade the same stocks. Brown, 
Ivković, Smith, and Weisbenner (2008) suggest that retail investors share their investment decisions with 
peers in their communities. 
To explore how geographical proximity affects information spillovers in our setting, we identify 
whether a brokerage has a single location and whether a Type 2 analyst and her peer covering the target are 
based in the same city. We find that 7% of Type 2 analysts work for brokers with a single location, and 
32% of Type 2 analysts share a location with the peer who covers the target firm. 
In the analysis tabulated in Column (1) of Table 4, we compare Type 2 analysts working at a single-
location brokerage, Type 2 x Same Location, against Type 2 analysts, Type 2, and against Type 3 analysts, 
Type 3. Type 1 analysts serve as the counterfactual. We find that the coefficient estimate for Type 2 is -
0.012 and not statistically significant. The estimate for Type 2 x Same Location is -0.033 and highly 
significant.  
We repeat the analysis for analysts with peers residing in the same locale. As shown in Column (2) 
of Table 4, the coefficient estimate for Type 2 continues to be negative (= -0.010) but not statistically 
significant, while the coefficient for Type 2 x Same Location continues to be strongly negative (= - 0.029) 
and highly significant. The strong negative slope on the interaction term in both specifications suggests that 
information spillovers are greater when analysts share a location. The insignificant negative slope on Type 
2 suggests that the information spillover effect is limited when analysts are geographically separated. 
Interestingly, in both specifications, the estimate for Type 2 x Same Location is more negative than 
the estimate for Type 3, suggesting that when an analyst is of Type 2 and shares a location with a peer 
covering a target,  she performs better than when she is of Type 3. 
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A second peer analyst characteristic that likely affects a Type 2 analyst’s performance is the level 
of knowledge a peer has about a target. Peer analysts’ understanding of targets likely grows with the number 
of years they have been covering such targets. We therefore experiment whether our spillover effect is 
stronger when target-analysts have been covering target firms for a longer period of time. We create an 
Experienced Peer dummy that equals one if the corresponding target-analyst’s experience is above the 75th 
percentile experience (= 4 years), and zero otherwise. As reported in Column (3) of Table 4, both the 
coefficient estimate for Type 2 and the estimate for Type 2 × Experienced Peer are negative and significant 
(-0.016 and -0.028, respectively), suggesting that information spillover effects are particularly strong when 
a peer has been covering a target for a long time. 
Next, we turn our attention to how team size affects information spillovers. Becker and Murphy 
(1992) argue that while specialization helps workers become more productive, increased specialization also 
makes it more difficult for workers to coordinate amongst each other, in particular if they are part of a larger 
team. Applied to our setting, we expect Type 2 analysts to find it more difficult to coordinate with peers if 
Type 2 analysts and their peers belong to larger teams. 
We define Industry Team Size as the natural logarithm of the number of analysts specializing in a 
given industry sector at a given brokerage. Column (4) of Table 4 shows that the coefficient estimate for 
Type 2 is -0.021 and the estimate for Type 2 × Industry Team Size is 0.015. Both estimates are statistically 
significant. The positive estimate for the interaction term suggests that the information spillover effect 
decreases with team size. 
In Column (5) of Table 4, we report the results of interacting Type 2 with the natural logarithm of 
the number of analysts working at the relevant brokerage, Broker Size, as an alternate measure of team size. 
We find that the interaction term between Type 2 and Broker Size is -0.016 albeit not statistically significant. 
One possible interpretation of the result that the spillover effect increases with Broker Size is that Broker 
Size captures organizational capital and the research support a brokerage provides, while Industry Team 
Size captures the coordination problems highlighted by Becker and Murphy (1992).  
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Overall, the results reported in this subsection shed light on opportunities for and limitations on 
information sharing. Guided by theory, we provide evidence that greater geographical distance and team 
size increase communication and coordination costs between analysts, which, in turn, limits the degree of 
information sharing and spillovers. Perhaps not surprisingly, the information spillover effect is also affected 
by how knowledgeable the peers are. 
 
4.3 All-Star Analysts 
As alluded to before, top-performing individuals in the financial services industry quickly earn “superstar” 
status. The presence of star analysts has the following implications for our study. First, if analysts of Type 
2 and Type 3 are systematically more likely to be of “superstar” status, then our prior results may be 
explained by the presence of stars.12 Second, stars likely command greater power within their firms. An 
analyst covering a target may therefore be more motivated to share information with an acquirer-analyst if 
the acquirer-analyst is a star analyst.13 Third, being of Type 2 might be particularly beneficial if the peer 
covering the target herself is a star and, as such, has a deeper understanding of and better connections to 
the target firm. 
We identify star analysts as those included in the Institutional Investor’s All-America Research 
Team, commonly known as “All-Star Analysts.” Dunbar (2000), Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001), and 
Clarke et al. (2007) provide evidence that firms value All-Star analysts when selecting underwriters and 
M&A advisors. Leone and Wu (2007) document that these All-Star analysts achieve better earnings forecast 
accuracy, better stock recommendation returns, and smaller optimism bias than their non-star 
counterparts.14 
                                                          
12 While we include analyst-broker fixed effects, there is time-series variation in All-Star status. 
13 Power, in this context, refers to an analyst’s ability to create a critical resource that she controls—her human capital. See Rajan 
and Zingales (1998) for an exposition of power in the theory of the firm and access to information as a critical resource. 
14 Leone and Wu (2007) discuss the selection procedure for the All-American team. To summarize the procedure, selection to the 
All-American team is based on survey data. Institutional Investor sends out a questionnaire to the directors of research and chief 
investment officers of money management institutions and also to sell-side analysts. Survey participants rank each analyst along 
the following six dimensions: accessibility and responsiveness, earnings estimates, useful & timely calls, stock selection, industry 
knowledge, and written reports. Scores for each analyst are calculated by taking the number of votes awarded by each survey 
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In our sample, 11% of analyst-year observations represent All-Star observations. We find variation 
in All-Star status both across analysts and within analysts (across time). Examining All-Star status by 
analyst type, we find that 11% of Type 2-analyst observations represent All-Star observations; the 
corresponding number for Type 3-analyst observations is 13%. Unconditionally, at least, this implies that 
All-Star status is not a determinant of Type 2 or Type 3 status. 
We begin by testing whether our result that analysts perform better when they are of Type 2 or 
Type 3 is robust to accounting for All-Star status. The results presented in Column (1) of Table 5 answer 
in the affirmative. The estimate for Type 2 analysts and the estimate for Type 3 analysts do not change 
when controlling for All-Star status. 
We next test whether the effect of being of Type 2 or Type 3 varies if the relevant acquirer-analyst 
is an All-Star. In particular, we interact Type 2 and Type 3 with an All-Star indicator. As reported in Column 
(2), we find that the estimate for the interaction between Type 2 and All-Star is -0.055 and statistically 
significant, suggesting that a peer covering a target is more strongly motivated to assist an acquirer-analyst 
if the acquirer-analyst has high status. 
Finally, in Column (3), we report the results of examining whether there is a positive effect on an 
acquirer-analyst’s performance when the corresponding peer covering the target is an All-Star. We estimate 
the same regression equation as in Column (2), but we now include an interaction between Type 2 and Peer 
is All-Star, which equals one if the corresponding target-analyst is an All-Star. The interaction produces a 
statistically significant negative slope of -0.040, suggesting that being of Type 2 is particularly 
advantageous if peers are of high quality. 
 
4.4 The Aggregate Information Environment  
The information environment an analyst faces is a combination of the internal information environment that 
is set by the organizational structure—the focus of this study—and the information environment that is 
                                                          




external to the organization. In our setting, the external information environment likely is affected by the 
number of analysts covering the acquirer and the target. 
In this subsection, we examine how the external information environment – through analyst 
coverage – affects analyst performance around M&As and relates to the information spillover effect. On 
average, there are 16 analysts covering an acquirer, while there are 6 analysts covering a target. The 
variation in coverage is not surprising given the relative sizes of acquirers and targets.  
We begin by examining whether the number of analysts following acquirers and targets affects 
acquirer-analysts’ forecast accuracy for newly formed firms. The results are reported in Column (1) of 
Table 6. We find that the coefficient estimate for Target Coverage is -0.002 and statistically significant, 
suggesting that uncertainty around earnings is lower when the external information environment for a target 
is richer.15 In contrast, the estimate for Acquirer Coverage is close to zero, suggesting that acquirer-analysts 
are already familiar with the acquirer and do not benefit if more “external” analysts cover the acquirer.  
We next test whether there is an interaction effect between analyst target coverage and our 
information spillover effect. As reported in Column (2) of Table 6, we find no reliable interaction between 
Type 2 and target coverage. 
 
4.5 Specialization 
We also examine how specialization affects the performance of analysts and relates to our information 
spillover effect. Specialization equals one if an M&A sector matches the sectoral specialization of an 
analyst, which is identified as the modal sector from the universe of firms that the analyst covers. On 
average, analysts cover 2.5 sectors and 73% of M&A activity is in their sectors of expertise. As reported in 
Column (3) of Table 6, we find that the inclusion of this variable has virtually no effect on our estimates 
for Type 2 and Type 3. We also find that the coefficient estimate for Specialization is -0.024 and significant, 
suggesting that analysts perform better when M&As are in their sectors of expertise. 
                                                          
15 In Column (1) of Table 6, we omit M&A fixed effects and, instead, apply year fixed effects because the variables of interest, 
target and acquirer-analyst coverage, vary at the M&A level. 
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In Column (4) of Table 6, we examine whether Specialization moderates with the information 
spillover effect. We find that neither the interaction term between Specialization and Type 2 nor the 
interaction term between Specialization and Type 3 is reliably different from zero. We thus fail to detect 
the presence of a strong moderating effect of specialization on information spillover. 
  
5. Identification Concerns 
In sum, our results provide an estimate of how performance varies with how information is structured within 
an organization. Our results imply that there is information spillover, which positively impacts individual 
performance. Our study thus concludes that organization matters for individual performance. Here, we 
discuss some final identification concerns. 
There may be confounding events in the two-year window before and after an M&A. If the 
confounding events affect forecast errors non-randomly across analyst type, our analysis suffers from an 
omitted variable bias. To mitigate this concern, we re-estimate our main results with a six-month window 
before and after an M&A. As shown in Column (1) of Table 7, our results continue to hold. 
A second concern is that our results may be due to selective disclosure. On August 15, 2000, the 
SEC adopted Regulation FD to address selective disclosure of information by publicly traded companies 
and other issuers. Regulation FD mandates that when an issuer discloses material nonpublic information to 
certain individuals or entities, the issuer must make full public disclosure of that information. To mitigate 
concerns that our results are due to selective disclosure and also to assess whether our results hold in later 
years when communication costs may have decreased, we re-run our main specification for the period 
running from 2000 through 2011. We present the results in Column (2) of Table 7. Once again, the main 
results continue to hold. 
Third, we allow for the possibility that our results are due to differences in pre-M&A earnings 
forecast errors across analyst types. The descriptive statistics presented in Table 2 suggest this is not the 
case, but, here, we formally rule out this selection concern. We re-estimate our main specification, but 
replace the dependent variable with Pre-M&A Forecast Error. Neither the estimate for Type 2 nor the 
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estimate for Type 3 is reliably different from zero, suggesting that there is no difference in pre-M&A 
earnings forecast error across analyst types. 
A further concern is that analyst performance by type is a function of heterogeneity in the level of 
information production rather than information spillovers. Specifically, if analysts systematically revise 
earnings forecasts more often when they are of Type 2 than when they are of Type 1, this may result in 
their providing more accurate forecasts. In Column (4) of Table 7, we report the results of examining 
whether productivity varies by analyst type by computing the change in the number of revisions for an 
analyst-broker around an M&A, ∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑚,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑚,𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ − 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑚,𝑝𝑟𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , and using 
∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑚,𝑡 as our dependent variable in our main specification. We find no link between analyst 
type and information production as both the estimate for Type 2 and the estimate for Type 3 are not reliably 
different from zero. Thus, it appears that information spillovers affect individual performance without 
affecting individual productivity. 
Finally, we take advantage of failed mergers to provide a placebo test to show that our results are 
not due to selection of analysts into M&As. We follow Seru (2014) and identify 726 M&As that were 
announced but unsuccessful using SDC Platinum.16 We are able to match 241 of these failed M&As with 
the IBES data required to examine forecast accuracy for potential acquirers both before and after merger 
withdrawal dates. To apply the same empirical strategy as in our main tests, we require variation in analyst 
type within analyst-broker pairs. Our final sample includes 1,030 forecasts from 365 analyst-broker pairs 
covering 180 failed M&As.  
On average, the change in forecast error around failed M&As is -0.0087. In Column (5) of Table 
7, we report the results of estimating our main regression equation on the failed M&A sample. In short, we 
                                                          
16 We collect our own sample of failed mergers given that the sample period in Seru (2014) does not match our sample period. 
Specifically, we identify failed mergers in SDC Platinum by applying the following filters: 1) the announcement date falls between 
1983 and 2011, 2) the acquirer and target are both U.S. public firms, 3) the acquirer’s market capitalization exceeds $10 million, 
4) the pre-announcement market value of the target is at least 5% of the acquirer’s market value, 5) the bidder seeks to own 100%, 
and 6) the bid failed. 
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find no effect of analyst type on analyst performance as neither the estimate for Type 2 nor the estimate for 
Type 3 is reliably different from zero. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we provide evidence of information spillovers within organizations that positively affect 
individual performance. In particular, we provide evidence that analysts covering acquirers prior to M&As 
struggle predicting the performance of newly formed firms, at least initially. Acquirer-analysts perform 
substantially better when they have in-house colleagues covering targets prior to M&As. At the same time, 
we find evidence of frictions in information sharing as acquirer-analysts perform best if they themselves 
cover both acquirers and targets prior to M&As. Our evidence reveals that these frictions are largely offset 
when acquirer- and target-analysts reside in the same locale, acquirer- and target-analysts are part of a small 
team and when target-analysts are likely of higher quality. 
Our research setting has two appealing features. First, we can measure individual performance in 
the form of earnings forecast accuracy. Second, we can contrast, for a given analyst working at a given 
brokerage, the analyst’s performance around M&As for which she has an in-house colleague covering the 
corresponding target against her performance around M&As for which she has no such colleague. We 
propose that our within–analyst–broker estimation absorbs selection effects that typically plague studies 
examining whether organization affects individual performance. 
The findings of this paper highlight the importance of information and knowledge as a critical 
resource and relate to the broader discussion of human capital in the theory of the firm. Our results suggest 
that organizations are important when explaining individual performance and help shed light on whether 
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M&A Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the 2,403 firm M&As used in the study. Acquirer Size and Target Size are 
the market capitalizations of the acquirer and the target, respectively, measured in millions of dollars in the quarter 
prior to the M&A. Target as % of Merged Firm is the ratio Target Size to (Acquirer Size + Target Size). Related M&A 
is a dummy variable that equals one if the acquirer and the target are in the same GICS sector. Acquirer Analyst 
Coverage and Target Analyst Coverage are the number of analysts following the acquirer and the target, respectively, 
in the period prior to the M&A. 
 
       Percentiles 
  N   Mean   St. Dev  25th 50th  75th 
              
Acquirer Size ($MM)  2,403 11,781 38,411 692 2,047 7,013 
Target Size ($MM)  2,403 1,975 6,702 95 285 1,055 
Target as % of Merged Firm  2,403 0.2 0.18 0.05 0.15 0.32 
Related M&A 2,403 0.68 0.47 0 1 1 
Acquirer Analyst Coverage  2,403 16.1 11.11 8 13 22 





Analyst Characteristics by Information Environment 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the main variables used in this study. Our sample contains 2,878 analyst-
brokerage pairs, composed of 2,394 analysts working for 215 brokers covering 2,403 M&As. In total, we have 15,939 
analyst-stock pairs of which 10,921 are by “Type 1 analysts” and of which 5,018 are in an information environment 
with “overlap” in coverage. Of those 5,018 pairs, 1,468 exhibit overlap at the brokerage-level, i.e., they represent 
situations in which the acquirer-analyst has a colleague working at the same brokerage covering the target prior to the 
M&A (≡ “Type 2 analysts”); 3,550 exhibit overlap at the analyst-level, i.e., they represent situations in which the 
acquirer-analyst also covers the target prior to the M&A (≡ “Type 3 analysts”). Forecast Error prior to M&A is 
defined as the absolute difference between analyst i's most recent quarterly earnings-per-share (EPS) forecast and the 
actual quarterly EPS, divided by the stock price as of the corresponding fiscal quarter end for the period prior to the 
M&A. We require EPS forecasts to be issued/updated at least once in the three months prior to the earnings 
announcement. ΔForecast Bias is the average forecast bias after the M&A minus the average forecast bias prior to 
the M&A; forecast bias is the difference between the analyst's most recent EPS forecast and the actual announced 
EPS, divided by the stock price as of the corresponding fiscal quarter end. Forecast Horizon is the number of days 
between the forecast date and the earnings announcement date. Firm-Specific Experience is the number of years the 
analyst has been covering the acquirer. Number of Stocks Covered is the number of stocks covered by the analyst. 
Number of Sectors Covered measures the number of GICS Sectors covered by the analyst. %Analysts Based in New 
York is the fraction of analysts based in New York. Acquirer Size ($MM), Target Size ($MM), Target as % of Merged 






Overlap at the 
   No Overlap  Brokerage-Level Analyst-Level 









       
#Analyst-Stock Pairs  15,939  10,921  1,468 3,550 
Forecast Error prior to M&A  0.17  0.17  0.16 0.18 
△Forecast Bias  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04 -0.04 
Forecast Horizon 48  48  46 47 
Firm-Specific Experience  4.27  4.22  4.06 4.52 
Number of Stocks Covered  18.61  18.64  16.50 19.38 
Number of Sectors Covered  2.08  2.04  1.96 2.26 
%Analysts Based in New York  0.27  0.26  0.30 0.29 
Acquirer Size ($MM)  20,645  19,582  35,300 17,831 
Target Size ($MM)  3,281  1,500  6,331 6,940 
Target as % of Merged Firm  0.19  0.14  0.21 0.31 





Analyst Performance and Information Spillovers 
 
This table reports OLS estimates of regressions from △Forecast Error on analyst-type variables. For each analyst-
stock pair, we measure △Forecast Error as the percentage difference in the mean forecast error post-M&A and the 
mean forecast error pre-M&A. Forecast Error is defined as the absolute difference between analyst i's most recent 
quarterly earnings-per-share (EPS) forecast and the actual quarterly EPS, divided by the stock price as of the 
corresponding fiscal quarter end. We require EPS forecasts to be issued/updated at least once in the three months prior 
to the earnings announcement. We compute the forecast error for quarterly earnings announced in the two year-
window around the effective date of the M&A. Type 2 equals one if the acquirer-analyst has a colleague working at 
the same brokerage covering the target prior to the M&A. Type 3 equals one if the acquirer-analyst also covers the 
target prior to the M&A. Specifications include analyst-broker fixed effects (Columns (1), (2), and (4)) and M&A 
fixed effects (Columns (1) - (4)). Column (3) includes analyst-broker-sector fixed effects. Columns (2) through (4) 
include time-varying analyst characteristics. The analyst characteristics include Firm-Specific Experience, Number of 
Stocks Covered, Number of Sectors Covered, and Team Size. The samples in Columns (3) and (4) contain only analyst-
broker pairs that have variation in type within a GICS sector and pairs for which the acquirer is five times the size of 
the target, respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are computed after allowing for correlations 
across observations in a given broker-analyst and M&A. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 
and 1 percent levels. 
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Analyst Characteristics No Yes  Yes Yes 
      
Analyst-Broker Fixed Effects Yes Yes  No Yes 
Analyst-Broker Sector Fixed Effects No No  Yes No 
M&A Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
      
Observations 15,939 15,939  14,770 9,956 






Analyst Performance and the Nature of Spillovers 
 
This table replicates Table 3, but includes the following interaction terms and additional controls: Same Location 
captures whether the Type 2 analyst works for a brokerage with a single location (Column (1)) or whether the Type 2 
analyst works for a brokerage with multiple locations, but the Type 2 analyst and the peer following the target reside 
in the same locale (Column (2)). Experienced Peer is a dummy variable that equals one if the number of years the 
peer had been covering target is in the top quartile of its distribution. Industry Team Size is the natural logarithm of 
the number of in-house colleagues working within the acquirer's GICS sector. Broker Size is the number of analysts 
working at the acquirer-analyst’s brokerage. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are computed after 
allowing for correlations across observations in a given broker-analyst and M&A. *, ** and *** represent statistical 


































































































































































                
Analyst Characteristics Yes Yes   Yes   Yes Yes 
                
Analyst-Broker Fixed Effects Yes Yes   Yes   Yes Yes 
M&A Fixed Effects Yes Yes   Yes   Yes Yes 
                
Observations 15,939 15,939   15,939   15,939 15,939 
R-squared 0.81 0.81   0.81   0.81 0.81 




Analyst Performance and the Role of Skill 
 
This table replicates Table 3, but includes the following interaction terms and additional controls: All-Star and Peer 
is All-Star equal one if the acquirer-analyst and the peer covering the target, in year t, are part of the Institutional 
Investors All-America Research Team, respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are computed 
after allowing for correlations across observations in a given broker-analyst and M&A. *, ** and *** represent 
































































        
Analyst Characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
        
Analyst-Broker Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
M&A Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations 15,939 15,939 15,939 





Analyst Performance, Aggregate Information Environment, and the Role of Specialization 
 
This table replicates Table 3, but includes the following interaction terms and additional controls: Target Coverage 
and Acquirer Coverage are the number of analysts following the target and the acquirer prior to the M&A, 
respectively. Specialization is a dummy variable that equals one if the M&A sector matches the sectoral specialization 
of the analyst, which is identified as the modal sector from the universe of firms that the analyst covers. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses and are computed after allowing for correlations across observations in a given 
broker-analyst and M&A. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. 
 
  




































   














    
Type 2 × Specialization 
  
    -0.006 
(0.018) 
Type 3 × Specialization 
  
    0.019 
(0.015) 




        
Analyst Characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
           
Analyst-Broker Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes No  No No 
M&A Fixed Effects No Yes  Yes Yes 
           
Observations 15,939 15,939  15,939 15,939 








This table replicates Table 3 with the following modifications: In Column (1), we only consider the six-month period before and after the M&A (as opposed to the 
two-year period). In Column (2), we re-estimate our regression equation for the 2000 - 2011 sample period. In Column (3), we examine if the pre-M&A Forecast 
Error varies by analyst type. In Column (4), we examine if the change in information production around the M&A varies by analyst type, where we measure the 
change in information production as the change in the number of forecast revisions made by an analyst. In Column (5), we estimate our regression equation on a 
sample of 180 announced but withdrawn M&As (“Failed M&As”). Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are computed after allowing for correlations 
across observations in a given broker-analyst and M&A. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. 
 
  
Δ Forecast Error, 




















Δ Forecast Error 





























        
Analyst Characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
        
Analyst-Broker Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
M&A Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
        
Observations 15,939 5,059  15,939 15,939  1,030 
R-squared 0.75 0.87  0.83 0.41  0.51 
 
 
